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Introduction
The relationship between populism and religion is complicated. Some aspects of populism
seem to be at odds with religion, such as the claim of absolute authority coming from the
people’s will rather than from a divine deity or clerical leader. However, other aspects of
populism are similar to religious principles, such as the importance of morality in
decision-making and strong beliefs of a dichotomy between Good and Evil. While the
connection between religion and populism is interestingly complex and potentially illuminating,
there has been relatively little work done to examine this relationship (Mudde 2015).
In this study, I focus on one specific example of the relationship between populism and religion:
evangelical Christianity’s populist tendencies. I focus on evangelicals because they seem to have
a unique connection to populist movements in the US (Zuquete 2017, Smith & Woodhead 2018).
Do evangelical Christians have higher populist attitudes than other Christians, and is this true in
all parts of the world?
This research memo aims to answer this question using comparative survey data from Chile and
the United States. I find that evangelicals are significantly more populist than other religious
groups in the US, but in Chile evangelicals are not more populist than other groups. This
connection in the US has to do with the evangelical identity in a broader national context much
more than with evangelical religious beliefs. This finding opens the door for future research on
the relationship between evangelicalism and populist attitudes.
This memo proceeds as follows. First, I summarize existing scholarship on the relationship
between evangelical Christianity (and Christianity in general) and populism and identify gaps
in this work. I then describe results I found from my analysis of populist attitudes and religion in
Chile and the US, followed by a discussion of this analysis and its place in the existing literature.
Defining Populism
Populism has been defined in many different ways in social science scholarship, but scholars
agree that populist rhetoric represents politics as two main blocs: the elite versus “the people.”
This division is political and vertical; the people are the power-seekers, while the elite or
establishment are the power holders (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). The people
populists claim to represent are typically ordinary citizens who are purportedly being neglected
by special interests such as big business or political leaders. Populists are champions of the rights
of these “people,” who are understood to be more virtuous than the malicious and selfish elites.
The people are also understood as having a unanimous will; the populist leader’s job is to discern
this will and enact it into policy when elected to office (Mudde 2004; Canovan 1999). While all
definitions of populism recognize the importance of “the people” vs. the elite dichotomy in
populism, they disagree on where these ideas come from. Some believe that populism is simply
a political style (Laclau 2005) or a political strategy (Roberts 2006) used by politicians to unite
and mobilize their constituents. Others claim populism is a Manichaean or dualistic discourse
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“that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite” (Hawkins
2009). This definition is called the “ideational approach” because of its assumption that populism
is a set of independent ideas of left-right dimensions of political ideology.
I use the ideational definition of populism for this memo because I think it is the best at
distinguishing populism from other political attitudes. An ideational definition of populism does
this because it describes the people and the elite in general terms, which can be applied to
individual cases and circumstances. Defining who fits into either of these two categories depends
on the country’s demography, political context, and even the “style” of populism. So, the
ideational approach to populism allows voters and political leaders to have “populist attitudes”
that can either be activated or remain dormant. Considering populism in this way allows for a
more comparative measurement of populism. For example, Hawkins, Kaltwasser, and Andreadis
(2018) find that while levels of populist attitudes are similar in Chile and Greece, populist
attitudes are more predictive of voting behavior in Greece than they are in Chile. Thus, this
definition will be best when comparing levels of populism in the US and Chile.
Populism and Evangelicalism
Evangelicalism is a Christian movement that is gaining popularity throughout the globe (Stanley
2013). Evangelicalism is trans-denominational? , meaning that evangelicals can be found in
almost every Protestant denomination and tradition, including Baptist and Pentecostal churches
(Mohler 2011). In 2016, about two-thirds of all Protestants and one in four Christians were
evangelicals (De Senneville 2016). The largest proportion of evangelicals in the world live in the
United States, where they are the single largest religious group and comprise one-quarter of the
nation’s population (FitzGerald 2017). Evangelicals ‘core beliefs include the centrality of
conversion (or the "born again" experience) in receiving salvation, the absolute authority of the
Bible, and in evangelism, or spreading the Christian message (Price 1993).
The literature on populism and evangelicalism is relatively new and, therefore, not
all-encompassing. Much of the current work on this topic looks specifically at which populist
parties and leaders evangelicals have historically voted for and supported. The Oxford Handbook
of Populism chapter on populism and religion identifies the first religious populist party as the
US-based People’s Party in the 1890s, which was primarily supported by Protestant evangelicals
(Zuquete 2017). This movement framed elites as any holder of power they saw as immoral or
oppressive. They believed that these elites would change the US from a free and God-fearing
society into a Satanic tyranny unless stopped. The chapter also acknowledges the
“Teavangelical” movement that emerged from the secular Tea Party movement in the early
2010s. The Teavangelicals called for small government and fiscal conservatism based on their
interpretation of the Bible.
The relationship between evangelicalism and populism gained renewed interest in 2016, with the
populist Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of populist President Donald Trump in the
US. Both phenomena were influenced heavily by Protestant Christians (Smith and Woodhead
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2018). However, in the US, Trump’s election was supported by highly religious evangelicals,
while in the UK, the Brexit vote was supported by many Anglicans who didn’t attend church
regularly. In fact, most evangelicals in the UK voted to remain in the European Union. This
finding indicates that the Evangelicals’ political behavior isn’t monolithic across countries. Thus
the connection between Evangelicalism and populism isn’t as clear-cut as it may initially appear.
What does evangelicalism look like in Latin America, where Catholicism has historically
dominated the religious sphere? Evangelicalism is proliferating in the region while Catholic
membership is declining (Pew 2014). This decline of Catholicism in Latin America could be
indicative of growing distrust in traditional institutions. Many populist politicians in Latin
America, like Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil or Fabricio Alvarado of Costa Rica, have attained support
from evangelicals for their socially conservative policy proposals (Raderstorf & Reif 2018).
While there may be growing support for populists from evangelicals in Latin America, this
support is much less consistent than from evangelicals in the US.
While studies on populism and evangelical Christianity are few, there has been interest in the
relationship between populism and Christianity as a whole. Much of the current literature on
populism and Christianity has focused on populist movements in Europe. Additionally, much of
this work addresses Christianity’s use by right-wing populist parties simply as an anti-Muslim
identity. In Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion (Morzouki et al, 2016), the
authors consider many right-wing populist parties in Europe that use Christian identities to
justify xenophobic policy changes. For example, they indicate that the French populist party,
Front National (now called the National Rally), justifies anti-immigration measures in the name
of Christian identity, ironically putting itself at odds with the Catholic church. Sociologist Roger
Brubaker uses the term “Christianism” rather than Christianity to differentiate between Christian
identity and Christian beliefs. Brubaker argues that Christianism, which he defines as a method
of promoting liberal Christian values in contrast to the undesirability of undemocratic Muslim
cultural values (Brubaker 2017), is how populists incorporate religion into their movements.
These studies of Christianity and populism examine religion as a very broad identity without
looking at specific religious affiliations, like evangelical Christianity.
Although the empirical work that has been done is useful to understand more about the
evangelicals that support populist movements in the US, almost none of the literature looks at
countries outside the West. This is the hole I attempt to fill with this research memo.
Research Design
To evaluate the relationship between evangelicalism and populism, I examine the cases of Chile
and the US. Chile isn’t a perfect representative of Latin America, but it is useful for my analysis
in unique ways. First, while the US has a history of religious populism and a current resurgence
of populism on both the right and left, Chile has experienced lower numbers of populist
movements or leaders that gain national recognition. Populist attitudes can exist whether or not
they are activated (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017), so this does not present a problem for
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comparison. In fact, the differences in populist movements may provide information about how
and why evangelicalism has been correlated with populism in certain contexts.
Second, Chile’s religious demography is an outlier in Latin America’s religious landscape. Most
Latin American countries have seen Catholics –especially low-income Catholics– leaving the
church and becoming evangelical. It’s estimated that more than 30% of the population in Central
American countries is evangelical Christian (Rodríguez 2018). However, in Chile, the number of
evangelicals has remained at about 18% for the past seven years, while the number of people
with no religious affiliation has continued to grow to 32% in 2019 (Universidad Católica 2019).
Since Chile is an outlier for Latin American countries, this limits the external validity of the
analysis. However, if evangelicalism inherently has a connection to populism, we would expect
to see it in evangelicals in Chile as much as in other Latin American countries. If we don’t see
this connection, it suggests that something else related to evangelicalism is causing populist
sentiments among evangelicals in the US.
Populism in the US
To understand the historic connection between evangelicalism and populism, I look at two
historical populist movements, the People’s Party and the Tea Party movement and their
relationship to evangelicalism. These cases show us that the evangelical movement in the US has
been connected to populism for centuries.
People’s Party (1880s)
One of the first populist movements in the US, the People’s Party, was started partially because
of anti-Catholic sentiment among protestant farmers. These farmers believed that elites
(sometimes categorizing them as Catholic elites) were not looking out for farmers and other
working-class people enough. However, populist leaders who emerged from this movement
deliberately denounced these anti-Catholic sentiments, seeing them as going against the
American principle of religious liberty (Zuquete 2017).
The movement was anti-monopoly and anti-Wall Street (Betz 2017), essentially a leftist populist
movement that called for economic protections for farmers and redistribution of wealth
accumulated by crony capitalists. Thus, while it may seem that evangelicals are more populist
because they are extremely conservative, in the 1880s they were supportive of this leftist populist
movement. This supports the idea that there is something about evangelical identity, apart from
conservative ideology associated with populism. To contrast this historical example, we will now
look at a more recent right-wing populist movement in the US, the Tea Party movement.
Tea Party Movement and Teavangelicalism (2010s)
The Tea Party movement initially started as a libertarian political movement that focused on
reducing government size and scope in the US, especially in fiscal matters (Somashekhar 2010).
The movement has never had a formal leader or hierarchy, but many organizations define
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themselves as Tea Party groups. Many of these Tea Party organizations have emphasized
avoiding social issues as part of their platforms, restricting the focus of the movement to fiscal
matters like government spending and national debt.
However, while the roots of the movement were based on libertarian ideas, in practice, over 50%
of self-identified Tea Party members are evangelical Christians (Good 2010), which is why many
pundits label this large sub-group of the movement the Teavangelicals (Boorstein 2010). Many
of these Teavangelical organizations engage with social policies like abortion or gun control,
which looks more like classic US conservativism than libertarianism. However, there is nothing
about the Teavangelical movement that is inherently connected to evangelical religious beliefs.
The social views that the movement promotes, like anti-abortion and anti-immigration stances, or
pro-gun policies, are significant parts of the Republican party platform and have little to do with
the evangelicals’ religious views about Christianity (where does it say that we shouldn’t allow
immigrants into the US in the Bible?). This supports my finding that evangelicalism is a
significant cause of populism when controlling for religiosity (shown in the Empirical Results
section, Table 1).
Thus, it seems that populist movements in the US have a strong connection with evangelical
Christianity. While some of this may be due to evangelicals being more conservative than other
groups in recent years, the evidence shows that the relationship between evangelicalism and
populism is more consistent than the connection between ideology and populism.
Populism in Chile
Currently, Chile has not experienced populist movements that have been effective on the national
scale. However, a historical study of populism in Latin America reveals important examples of
populist leaders in Chile, going back as far as 1921.
For this memo, the example of Salvador Allende (1971-1974) is perhaps the most useful.
Allende was a Marxist and a life-long committed member of the Socialist Party of Chile (Mabry
2006). He unsuccessfully ran for president many times before finally being elected in 1971.
While scholars have not categorized Allende as populist in the past, more recent analysis has
found strong evidence of populism in his rhetoric (Drake 1978). Thus, Allende’s form of socialist
populism can be viewed as similar to current examples in Latin America, like Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela.
Initially, Allende received support from Chile’s Christian Democrats party, a left-wing Catholic
party (Mabry 2006). The Citizen Left Party (formerly the Christian Left Party) was also
supportive of Allende and formed partly in response to the Allende movement. There were few
evangelicals in Chile at the time: the first evangelical denomination had only been created
about 40 years earlier and faced fierce opposition from the Catholic church (Hudson 1994). So, it
is hard to exactly measure who evangelicals supported at this time. Furthermore, while Allende
received support from some Catholic groups, his government was not associated with religion
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very much.Thus, the most recent movement of populism in Chile was associated loosely with
Catholicism but certainly didn’t have any connection to evangelical Christianity. This explains
why the relationship between populism and evangelicalism (and religion in general) in Chile is
much weaker than it is in the US.
Empirical Analysis
To measure the correlation between the religious preference and populist attitudes in these two
countries, I use data from two surveys. For Chile, I use data from the United Nations World
Development Indicators. This survey has approximately 1,805 respondents, 294 of which
self-identify as evangelical Christians. For the US, I use data from a survey conducted by the
Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES), which has 1,000 responses, and 314
identified as born again Christian (synonymous with evangelical Christian).
In each survey, to measure populist attitudes, an inventory developed by Agnes Akkerman and
others (Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2012) is used. While the Chilean survey includes
all of the questions listed below, the US survey only includes half (highlighted in the list below).
1. The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.
2. The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
3. The political differences between the people and the elite are bigger than the political
differences among the people.
4. I’d rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by an experienced politician.
5. Politicians talk a lot without accomplishing much.
6. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
7. Ordinary people can’t be trusted to make the right choices about our nation’s problems.
8. Our country would function better if the important decisions were made by independent
experts.
9. Politicians should guide the people rather than follow them.
10. Democracy is about achieving compromise among differing viewpoints.
11. In a democracy it’s important to listen to the opinion of all groups
12. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.
13. The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.

To determine the effect of evangelicalism on populist attitudes, I use Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression with robust standard errors. I use factor analysis to create a single variable for
populist attitudes in both surveys (see Appendix A). The factors used in each dataset have
eigenvalues of over 2. Chile’s factor accounts for approximately 25% of the variation in the
populism index, while the US factor accounts for about 30%. These factors are the dependent
variables used in the models. To test the effect of evangelicalism on populist attitudes, I create a
dummy variable in both surveys. I then use three different models to test this effect.
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Model 1 tests the effect of evangelicalism with selected control variables. I include education and
income because rich and highly educated people are often framed as elites. These variables are
collected by asking respondents to place themselves in categories (for income, they are given
upper and lower bounds of dollar amounts for each type). Many evangelicals have lower levels
of education and income, so I would like to see if the effect of evangelicalism is independent of
these factors. I also include a control variable for ideology (low values are leftist responses; high
values are rightist) because others have found that ideology can moderate the effect of populist
attitudes (Hawkins et al., 2018). These ideology variables are self-reported, so they are based on
the respondent’s ideological identification and not on the actual ideology of their positions. Since
evangelicals tend to be conservative, adding this variable will show the effect of evangelicalism
if ideology is held constant. Finally, I add race, age, and gender to the model to ensure that these
demographic characteristics don’t affect the coefficients. A second model uses the same
independent variables, plus control for religiosity, measured by church attendance. Model 3
interacts religiosity (coded from low to high) with evangelicalism to test if more religious
evangelicals are more populist than non-religious evangelicals. For more descriptive information
about these variables, see Appendix B.
Empirical Results
I find that simple t-tests in both samples revealed that evangelicals are significantly more
populist than non-evangelicals in the US. Still in Chile, evangelicals are not statistically different
from other religious groups in their support for populism. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show these
differences graphically.

Figure 1: Difference in Populism of Evangelicals from Other Groups in Chile
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Figure 2: Difference in Populism of Evangelicals from Other Groups in the US
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Now, to identify what this difference can be attributed to, we turn to OLS regression models of
populism and religion below.
Table 1: Evangelicalism on General Populism
VARIABLES

Model 1

evangelical

0.001
(0.131)

Chile
Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

-0.037
(0.138)
0.003
(0.060)

-0.323
(0.308)
-0.026
(0.068)
0.145
(0.144)

0.154**
(0.068)

0.017
(0.027)
0.025
(0.020)
0.118***
(0.029)

0.009
(0.031)
0.021
(0.023)
0.117***
(0.031)

0.010
(0.031)
0.021
(0.023)
0.115***
(0.031)

-0.500***
(0.153)

-0.350
(0.223)

-0.292
(0.230)

-0.064**
*
(0.023)
-0.043*
(0.010)
0.089***
(0.023)
-0.501**
*
(0.103)

378
0.066

378
0.053

947
0.095

religiosity
evangelical X religiosity

educ
income
ideology

Constant

Observations
474
R-squared
0.071
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

United States
Model 2
Model 3
0.220***
(0.074)
-0.043
(0.022)

0.348**
(0.177)
-0.032
(0.026)
0.034
(0.043)

-0.061***
(0.024)
-0.044*
(0.010)
0.085***
(0.020)

-0.061***
(0.023)
-0.044*
(0.023)
0.085***
(0.020)

-0.435***
(0.169)

-0.456***
(0.173)

936
0.098

936
0.099

Table 1 shows the results from the OLS regression models. In Chile, evangelicalism does not
have a significant effect on populism. Evangelicalism has a significant (and substantial) effect on
populism in the US, although the R-squared is not particularly high. Education has a significant
negative effect on populism in the US but has no effect in Chile. The fact that education, a
characteristic commonly related to elitism, does not affect populist attitudes may be due to the
small sample size (and thus low statistical power) in the Chilean survey. Income does not have a
significant effect in either country. This observation is consistent with views that populist views
have become more common among middle and even upper-class individuals worldwide
(Rodríguez 2018).
The most puzzling result is that ideology has a significant effect in both countries, in which
conservativism causes higher levels of populist attitudes. Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2018) find
that populist attitudes are not determined by ideology. However, it is essential to note that the
classification of ideology is very simple in both surveys; respondents simply self-select where
they stand on the left-right scale. This method is much simpler than the process to identify
respondents’ ideology used by Hawkins and Kaltwasser, so it may be that populists are more
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likely to call themselves right-leaning, even if they are not. Additionally, Tables 2 and 3 show
that conservative ideology does not predict every question in the populism index, so the result
could simply be due to the factor that was selected and not about actual populist attitudes.
Tables 2 and 3 show Model 2 on specific questions about populism (questions 1, 2, 6, and 10
above). These tables show four of the questions from the populist index. Evangelicalism in the
US has the most substantial effect on perceptions of who should make the most critical
decisions in government (in this case, evangelicals believe the people should make the most
important decisions). In Chile, evangelicalism’s lack of an effect can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2: Evangelicalism on Specific Populism Questions, Chile

Chile
VARIABLES
evangelical
education
income
ideology
Constant

Democracy
Compromise

Will of
People

Compromise - Sell Out

People
Decisions

-0.130
(0.099)
-0.032
(0.021)
-0.005
(0.018)
0.051
(0.024)
1.828***
(0.181)

0.017
(0.118)
-0.032
(0.024)
0.066***
(0.020)
0.072***
(0.026)
1.544***
(0.113)

-0.041
(0.120)
0.058**
(0.025)
-0.035*
(0.021)
0.036
(0.028)
2.057***
(0.114)

0.031
(0.121)
-0.019
(0.024)
0.055***
(0.019)
0.114***
(0.029)
1.614***
(0.109)

539
0.047

515
0.015

538
0.057

Observations
425
R-squared
0.040
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Evangelicalism on Specific Populism Questions, US

United States
VARIABLES
evangelical
income
education

Democracy
Compromise

Will of
People

Compromise - Sell
Out

People Decisions

-0.006
(0.086)
-0.008
(0.023)
0.064***
(0.023)

0.080
(0.071)
-0.026
(0.022)
-0.006
(0.023)

0.011
(0.095)
-0.009
(0.029)
-0.178***
(0.028)

0.190**
(0.088)
-0.038
(0.027)
-0.063**
(0.027)
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ideology
Constant

-0.163***
(0.022)
4.255***
(0.179)

Observations
939
R-squared
0.102
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.053***
(0.019)
3.664***
(0.171)

0.232***
(0.024)
2.825***
(0.213)

0.087***
(0.023)
3.517***
(0.190)

938
0.059

938
0.174

939
0.068

These results give an interesting insight into the political behavior of evangelicals in the US.
Evangelicals are more conservative than other religious groups (Lipka 2016), and these results
show that conservatives are more populist than liberals. Yet when controlling for ideology, the
effect of evangelicalism is still significant. Additionally, when controlling for religiosity, the
coefficient on evangelicalism is statistically significant, and the magnitude increases. This
finding supports the idea that the connection between populism and evangelicalism has more to
do with evangelical identity than it does with their religious beliefs and values. We see this
because when holding church attendance constant evangelicalism has an even stronger
correlation with populism.
In Chile, evangelicalism does not have a connection to populism. Thus, perhaps the reason why
evangelicals are slightly more populist than non-evangelicals in Chile (although not statistically
so) has to do with the fact that evangelicals in Latin America are more conservative than other
religious groups (Pew 2014).
Conclusion
Using quantitative and qualitative methods in Chile and the US, I find evidence that evangelical
identity is associated with populist attitudes in the US. Still, this association does not hold for
Chile. This is shown in OLS regression results from survey data that measures populist attitudes,
as well as analysis of historical examples of populist movements in both countries.
The reasons that evangelicals in some places are more populist than other religious groups are
not immediately apparent. It does not seem to be the result of evangelical teachings or beliefs.
However, when controlling for this, evangelical self-identification is still significant; therefore, it
must have something to do with evangelical identity. I do not attempt to identify the nature of
this identity or why it is associated with populism. While this idea was not explored in this
memo, it could be the topic of future research on populism and religion.
The findings presented here have interesting implications for future study of populism in
comparative politics. Future studies could examine other Christian denominations (like Orthodox
Christianity) or look more closely at religiosity’s effect on populist attitudes. Furthermore, this
memo focused exclusively on Christianity and populism, but the findings could help
understand connections between other religious faiths (like Islam, Buddhism) and populism.

13

Analysis of non-Christian religious faiths lack the literature on religion and populism, so further
studies to identify the connection between populism, ideology, and religion would be a welcome
addition.
Additionally, to better understand the connection between evangelicalism and populism,
additional countries with similar regional environments could be compared to eliminate
idiosyncratic differences that may impact results. Comparing US survey data on populism to
other Western countries may allow us to be more precise about the differences between
evangelicals and other Christians in the global West. Likewise, comparing the Chilean data to
that in other Latin American neighbors would showcase the broader impact of Latin American
evangelicalism.
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Appendix A: Populism Variable Summary Statistics
Chile
populism

Observations
1,423

Eigenvalu
Factor e
1
2.83372
2
1.49386
3
1.41386
4
0.92982
5
0.81841
6
0.73003
7
0.70588
8
0.6782
9
0.60596
10
0.45214
11
0.33812

US
populism

Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Differenc
e
1.33986
0.08001
0.48404
0.11141
0.08838
0.02415
0.02768
0.07224
0.15382
0.11402
.

Observations
995
Eigenvalu
e
2.03042
1.53253
1.06582
0.71895
0.6768
0.51726
0.45822

Mean
.000
Proportio
n
0.2576
0.1358
0.1285
0.0845
0.0744
0.0664
0.0642
0.0617
0.0551
0.0411
0.0307

Mean
.000

Differenc
e
0.49789
0.46671
0.34688
0.04214
0.15954
0.05904

Proportio
n
0.2901
0.2189
0.1523
0.1027
0.0967
0.0739
0.0655

Std. Dev
1

Min
-2.05

Max
4.78

Min
-4.06

Max
1.90

Cumulativ
e
0.256
0.3934
0.5219
0.6065
0.6809
0.7472
0.8114
0.8731
0.9282
0.9693
1

Std. Dev
1
Cumulativ
e
0.2901
0.509
0.6613
0.764
0.8606
0.9345
1
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Appendix B (Questions from US survey)
Income: “Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income?”
Possible responses:
1

$0 - $29,999

2

$30,000 - $59,999

3

$60,000 - $79,999

4

$80,000 - $119,999

5

$120,000 - $250,000 or more
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Education: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”
Possible responses:
-

High school graduate

-

Some college

-

2-year

-

4-year

-

Post-grad

Evangelical: “Would you describe yourself as a ‘born-again’ or evangelical Christian, or not?”
Possible responses:
-

Yes

-

No

Religiosity: “Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?”
Possible responses:
-

Never

-

Seldom

-

A few times a year

-

Once or twice a month

20

-

Once a week

-

More than once a week

Ideology: “How would you rate yourself?”
Possible responses:
-

Very Liberal

-

Liberal

-

Somewhat Liberal

-

Middle of the Road

-

Somewhat Conservative

-

Conservative

-

Very Conservative

Race: “What racial or ethnic group best describes you?”
Possible responses:
-

White

-

Black

-

Hispanic

-

Asian

-

Native American

-

Mixed
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-

Other

-

Middle Eastern

Age: “In what year were you born?” [I subtracted this variable from 2012, the year this survey
was given, to create an age variable.]

Gender: “Are you male or female?”
Possible responses:
-

Male

-

Female

